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Taking the Measure of Things: 
The Role of Measurement in EU Trade 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper theoretical and empirical models of intra-industry trade are developed in which 
economic activities, based on measurement and an associated measurement infrastructure, play a 
role in creating product variety. The paper discusses how the measurement infrastructure which 
includes institutions conducting metrological research and standard setting organization reduces 
transactions costs, especially in markets where differences in product characteristics are important. 
The theoretical analysis focuses on the public good characteristics of the measurement 
infrastructure, considering how the infrastructure impacts upon trade in a model based upon 
product differentiation under monopolistic competition. In the econometric analysis, indicators of 
the strength of the infrastructure within the EU, both across industries and across countries, suggest 
that measurement activities are important in determining the extent of bi-lateral EU intra-industry 
trade. Despite many common elements in the measurement infrastructure across the EU, there is 
also some evidence of differential access to the infrastructure among EU members.  
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1. Introduction 
  Over the last two decades, economics has developed theories in which product 
differentiation provides an important element in the underlying mechanisms driving trade, growth, 
and location. In the theory of international trade, the creation of variety leads to intra-industry trade; 
in endogenous growth models increased varieties of intermediate inputs generates productivity 
advance in downstream industries, a process which may also lead to geographical agglomeration. 
Theoretical analysis in these areas is typically based upon models of monopolistic competition, 
where increasing returns prevail and market size matters in the generation of product variety. 
However the nature of the costs associated with product differentiation are rarely considered in any 
detail. This paper develops this element of such models by introducing measurement as an 
important channel for generating variety.  
  Successful product differentiation by firms is often founded upon distinctive intrinsic 
product characteristics, requiring that these characteristics be either directly observable, e.g. the 
colour of a table, or measured in ways that customers are able to comprehend, such as the table’s 
physical dimensions, where understanding is aided by an agreed standard unit of measurement. As 
products become more complex in terms of characteristics, buyers and sellers are likely to find such 
standards increasingly helpful. If for example the table-top is constructed of a novel material, its 
performance characteristics – e.g. colour fastness, reaction to heat or sunlight, durability - may be 
subject to uncertainty and the seller’s claims difficult to verify. Indeed, for advanced manufacturing 
technologies, Tassey (2000 p.589) notes “a range of measurement and test method standards 
provide information, which, by virtue of being universally accepted, greatly reduce transaction costs 
between buyer and seller.” Industrial standards relating to measurement and associated tests belong 
to what we term in this paper as the “measurement infrastructure” of an economy, the various 
institutions which link the science of metrology to the actual use of measures by industry and society 
and which typically require complementary investments at the level of the firm or household and the 
use of instruments. The paper considers the relationship between this measurement infrastructure 
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and the creation of product variety, developing both theoretical and empirical models of product 
differentiation and intra-industry trade. The empirical analysis is based on industrial and trade data 
relating to the European Union (EU), where standard development has increasingly taken a pan-
European form.  
  The paper is organised as follows. The following section describes the nature of 
measurement infrastructures and discusses their role in modern economies. Section 3 then shows 
how the concept of a measurement infrastructure can be embedded in a model of intra-industry 
trade. Section 4 discusses some econometric models based on the preceding analysis and presents 
the results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The Economic Role of Measurement 
  Much of the recent literature in growth economics has emphasised the role of knowledge, 
the externalities it creates, and the potential for active policy, especially in the areas of science and 
technology. However, effective policy intervention needs an understanding of the mechanisms 
which generate and link different types of knowledge, permitting assessments of the nature of the 
externalities involved and of how they are captured by institutions and firms.  The basic premise of 
this paper is that the concept of measurement, its associated institutions, and the economic activity 
which depend on them, provide important insights into the linkages between the creation of 
knowledge and its utilisation in the form of appropriable technologies, especially those which result 
in product differentiation. An important element in this latter process is the development of a 
codified knowledge base in the form of industrial standards. Moreover, the generic character of 
measurement and its pervasive use, especially in the production and marketing of manufactured 
goods, make the public good aspect of measurement activity important.  
  In a substantial review of the economics of measurement, Swann (1999) divides 
measurement activities in an economy into three main functional types – research, the development 
of measurement tools and infrastructure (e.g. the means for monitoring the environment or the 
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health impact of nano-technologies), and the operational use of tools and techniques for ‘day to day’ 
measurement – in both firms and households. Our main concern in this paper is with the 
mechanisms through which metrological research and the associated development of measurement 
tools impacts upon the ability of individual firms to differentiate their output. In advanced 
economies, a large part of basic metrological research is conducted by so-called National Metrology 
Institutes (NMIs). Examples of such bodies include the Germany’s Physikalisch-Technische 
Bundesanstalt (PTB) or the UK’s National Physical Laboratory (NPL). Typically financed in part by 
the government, they conduct not only basic research and measurement tool development, but also 
perform other activities which link the research output to industry and society.  At both PTB and 
NPL, much of the research is carried co-operatively with private industry. Figure 1 is intended to 
suggest how the knowledge generated by such NMIs may diffuse into an economy more widely.  
Four key processes are highlighted: standardisation, direct service provision, the accreditation of 
private sector laboratories and legal metrology (which underpins such areas as weights and measures 
and, increasingly, environmental protection). Patterns taken by the measurement infrastructure of 
course vary between countries, and the function of research may be undertaken by a different body 
from the regulatory function provided by legal metrology, or the accreditation of private calibration 
and testing laboratories1. In this paper however, we concentrate on the role of measurement in the 
EU, where measurement forms a coherent set of activities partly defined by various national 
institutions but also at the regional (or supra-national) levels2, a fact which raises questions about the 
extent of EU integration considered later in section 4.   
   
     {FIGURE 1 about here} 
                                                 
1 In the US for example. there is greater pluralism and no single national body, although the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) operates within the Department of Commerce and is charged with promoting “US 
innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science standards and technology in ways that 
enhance economic security” http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/general2.htm#Whatwedo 
 
2 The Measurement Instrument Directive for example provides a legal requirement for measurement standardization 
across the EU. The Commission also directly supports research in measurement and testing on a cross-sectoral and 
cross-country basis and provides assistance to clubs and networks such as EUROMET and EURACHEM (Williams 
2002). Pan-European institutions are also important in the creation of standards, as discussed further below 
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  In addition to their research and development role, NMIs are often heavily involved in the 
creation of industrial standards, a process particularly important from the point of view of this 
paper. NMIs are involved in standardisation in a number of ways. These include not only developing 
and maintaining the base of primary and reference standards used for purposes of traceability, but 
also providing input into the development of industrial standards produced by the technical 
committees of National Standards Bodies (such as the Deutsche Institut fur Norming (DIN) in 
Germany or the British Standard Institution (BSI), and, increasingly by international standards 
agencies, such as the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) or the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU).  In Europe, standardisation has now largely taken a pan-
European form, and the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) for example currently 
represents 30 member countries each of which adopts CEN standards in its own economy1. 
  Standards may fulfil any of a number of functions, including reduction in variety to achieve 
economies of scale, the promotion of inter-operability and network externalities, and the definition 
of minimum qualities, which may be important in the context of regulation. The theoretical 
economic literature on standards (Farrell and Saloner [1985] Katz and Shapiro [1985]), as well as the 
more well known case studies (e.g. David 1975), have concentrated on understanding the 
implications of individual standards, and especially the compatibility or inter-operability function, in 
circumstances where this function defines a ‘network’ which may operate across many individual 
firms. The literature distinguishes between de facto standards, created through the development of 
proprietary technology and which may involve a standards ‘race’ between competing proprietary 
technologies (e.g. Besen and Farrell [1994]), and de jure standards which emerge as the result of the 
deliberation and eventual consensus of a technical committee. Important recent contributions have 
                                                 
1 Some of the standards so developed support European legislation and regulation and conformity to a standard a form 
of compliance. Other pan-European standardisation bodies specialise in electro-technical standardisation (CENELEC) 
and in information and communication technologies (ETSI). The increasing internationalisation of standards is 
discussed in DTI (2005).   
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investigated the performance attributes of both types of process (e.g. Farell and Saloner 1988; 
Simcoe 2008; Farrell and Simcoe 2009). For an extensive review of the economics of standards see 
Swann (2000).   
  Measurement is likely of course to be integral to the specifications required for inter-
operability and consequential network effects. Here the literature suggests a public good effect in 
cases of positive adoption costs, where early adopters of a standard create  support the development 
costs on which later users may free-ride. Moreover fixed costs attached to development may mean 
that early adopters are unwilling to support development. The public good character is not of course 
limited to this effect alone, but as recognised by Kindleberger (1984), standards of many kinds 
provide a “strong” kind of public good by establishing a network such that “the more producers and 
consumers use a given standard, the more each gains from use by others through gains in 
comparability and interchangeability” (Kindelberger 1984, p. 377). Measurement is of course central 
to the whole concept of comparability, as is the credibility that attaches to publicly available 
standards.          
  In practice, actual standards documents may fulfil several of the functions described above, 
while in addition providing useful codified technological information. While in general standards 
serve to reduce the transactions costs of using the market and tend to promote product 
differentiation, it should however be pointed out that measurement may also serve as an input into 
the creation of variety reducing standards with a contrary effect. Moreover, measurement 
infrastructure may also contribute to the development of interfaces in ‘technology systems’ where 
measurement enables lower cost verification, which permits market based specialization along 
supply chains, and which may also thereby stimulate product diversity1.  
  Figure 1 suggests that much of the domestic knowledge flow between the NMIs and 
industry is mediated by instrument manufacturers and technical business services which carry out 
calibrations, test equipment and so on. UK evidence shows that together these types of business are 
                                                 
11
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the relevance of  measurement for supply-chain 
interfaces 
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the dominant purchasers of direct services from the NMIs (King et al. 2005) while the private 
laboratories are an important intermediary for small and medium sized companies (Temple and 
Williams 2002).   
One way of making the linkages depicted in Figure 1 more concrete is suggested by Swann 
(1999) who draws attention to the relationship between measurement and product differentiation. 
As Swann puts it, cumulative experience and learning in metrology and the associated development 
of measurement tools generates a “common pool of feasible measurements”. The size of this pool 
helps determine the size of another –  “the pool of measurable product characteristics.” A sub-set of 
this latter is the pool of feasible product characteristics (Swann 1999, p.9) from which producers can 
draw to make actual products available to customers. Swann also argues that much product 
innovation can be thought of not simply in terms of the improvement of given product 
characteristics but also in terms of novel product characteristics, giving “a combinatorial character to 
product innovation. How many variants can be produced depends (very roughly speaking) on the 
number of characteristics that can be combined” (ibid p. 19).    
A similar perspective to that of Swann has been provided by Tassey (e.g. 2000, 2004), who 
distinguishes between three types of knowledge base. In addition to the proprietary knowledge base 
of individual firms, Tassey also defines an industry’s generic technology base, and a set of what he 
terms “infratechnologies” that “provide a varied and critical infrastructure to support development 
of the generic technology and subsequent market applications” (Tassey 2000, p.589).  These infra-
technologies consist of “measurement and test methods, interface standards, scientific and 
engineering databases, and artefacts such as standard reference materials.” This knowledge base 
frequently takes the specific form of what Tassey calls “non-product” based standards, which play a 
key role in supporting the generic knowledge base of (perhaps) several industries1.      
                                                 
1 In the form of standards he argues they have a strong public good element. Moreover among the set of 
infratechnologies, Tassey gives an important place to measurement, citing a 1998 NIST study which estimated that the 
US semi-conductor industry would spend $5.5 billion on measurement, “much of which would end up as industry 
standards” (Tassey 2005, p109, footnote 11). 
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It is perhaps useful to illustrate the underpinning and generic role of measurement in 
enabling capabilities associated with the characteristics of products. Thermal conductivity is a 
fundamental property of materials and a key product characteristic in a range of industries, e.g. for 
catering equipment or textiles among consumer products, or in construction, for building materials. 
The NPL web-site (FAQ) lists 18 standard documents for measuring the thermal conductivity of 
different construction materials, refractories, and plastics1.  
The importance of measurement as an enabling technology can be explored empirically in 
many different ways - for example by directly linking it to productivity and growth. Temple and 
Williams (2002) for example, cite a number of studies which have attempted to link measurement 
research with productivity at an aggregate/macro-level. At a more micro level however, a recent 
study commissioned by NIST links measurement directly to productivity improvements in the U.S.  
semi-conductor industry over the period 1996-20062 (NIST 2007).  Here however we consider a 
more aggregative approach suggested by the link between measurement and product variety. 
The discussion so far suggests that two types of metric may be useful in gauging the 
differential importance of measurement between sectors or economies. The first is through the 
production and use of measuring instruments in an economy.3 Here, Williams (2002) estimates that 
production in the sector amounts to about 1% of total (pre-enlargement) EU industrial production. 
However he observes that this ratio varies considerably by country – ranging from 0.12% in 
Portugal to 2.04% in Sweden. More important than production (which will reflect specialisation in 
these sectors) is the extent of consumption of instruments. Figure 2 shows a plot of both production 
and consumption of instruments for EU economies, expressed as a proportion of industrial output. 
It can be seen that the use of instruments is closely related to the location of instrument production, 
                                                 
1 http://www.npl.co.uk/server.php?show=ConWebDoc.2136, accessed 18 July 2010 
 
2 It suggests an internal rate of return on investments made between 1996 and 2006 and accruing between 1997 and 
2011 of 67%  
 
3 One element of the second tier – testing facilities – is not distinguishable even at the 4-digit NACE coding from other 
types of business service. 
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although the larger consumers do appear to have something of a comparative advantage and be net 
exporters1.  
 
     {FIGURE 2 about here} 
  
  Detailed data on the extent of instrument use within sectors are not available for the EU on a 
country by country basis. However we can make use of the close association between measurement 
and industrial standards made publicly available through the national standards bodies (NSBs) 
discussed above. In the current context the existence of a catalogue of standards which can be 
counted provides a means of measuring the ‘size’ of their impact – a methodology used initially in 
Swann et al (1996) and considerably extended by Blind in a series of important studies (for example 
Blind 2001, 2004), and in the specific context of German-UK trade by Blind and Jungmittag (2005). 
This paper further develops the approach by considering a sub-set of ‘measurement related’ 
standards. The extent to which these latter figure against all standards in the catalogue of the BSI 
available at end 2003 is shown in Figure 3, using the PERINORM© search tool. It shows that a 
total of nearly 25,000 standards were available to UK producers. Counts of the abstracts of these 
documents revealed that around a quarter of these (6,600) included a reference to both a test 
procedure and measurement (which we term the ‘narrow’ count of measurement standards) while 
two-thirds (16,800) contained either or both (the ‘broad’ count of measurement standards). Either way 
it seems reasonable to conclude that standards are an important part of the measurement 
infrastructure  through which the work of the NMIs is distributed to the economy generally, and 
which makes increased private expenditures on measurement profitable.  
 
                                                 
1 One tentative explanation - but beyond the scope of this paper - is that geographically bounded technological spill-over 
effects (emanating in part from the NMIs) may be important in either/or the consumption and production of 
instruments. Below we use the overall cross-country pattern of instrument consumption/use as a possible factor in an 
econometric model of the factors determining intra-industry trade.  
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  {FIGURE 3 about here} 
Figure 3 also shows comparable counts for end 1985 and indicates that while there has been 
strong growth in the size of the total standards stock (5.6% per annum over the period), this has 
been roughly similar for ‘measurement related’ standards. Importantly much of this growth over the 
past two decades is attributable to the harmonisation of standards within the EU (see DTI 2005), 
and of course all the standards available from the BSI catalogue are available to producers anywhere 
– so that the size of the catalogue cannot realistically be employed as a country characteristic. 
However, we were able to count the size of the catalogue by industry and hence provide an industry 
characteristic for the empirical models considered below in section 4. Table 1 shows the distribution 
of measurement related standards for 2002 for the 22 sectors used.  It can be seen from the table 
that that the use of standards varies considerably across sectors – with the main users being found in 
the engineering industries which rely heavily on the products of what Nelson (1993) has called 
“systems technologies”; where products depend in their turn on the ability of individual firms to 
utilise the market to source components. In other measurement intensive technologies, e.g. in the 
chemical industries, access to components is perhaps less critical, and so, despite the large amounts 
spent on R&D, there will be less demand for publicly created standards which lower transactions 
costs, even though in-house measurement may be considerable.    
 
{TABLE 1 about here}  
 
In the empirical analysis reported below we make use of both types of metric described 
above, using them as proxies for the strength of the technology infrastructure as this relates to 
different industries and/or economies.  However, it is possible that both standards and varieties are 
a joint outcome of technology life cycles, with mature technologies – which are well understood - 
generating both more standards and more variety. Since this possibility is important for our 
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interpretation of the regression analysis below, we return to this point our concluding section.1 Here 
however we note that the count we use relates to measurement related standards (rather than all 
standards) and which may well develop relatively early in technology cycles, prior to the emergence 
of a dominant design (Utterback and Abernathy 1975).           
In order to generate specific hypotheses regarding the role of  measurement and standards in 
generating international trade, we next develop a model of  intra-industry trade which specifically 
bases itself  on the public good characteristics of  measurement standards described above. The 
literature suggests a number of  possible avenues for understanding product differentiation based 
upon either horizontal or vertical product differentiation. Models of  horizontal product 
differentiation have been based upon alternative specifications of  consumer choice - either the 
Dixit-Stiglitz ‘love of  variety’ (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) or the Lancaster ‘ideal variety’ approach 
(Lancaster 1979). As far as international trade is concerned however, the comprehensive treatment 
by Helpman and Krugman (1985) suggests that they both lead to similar results. With increasing 
returns at the level of  the firm in models of  monopolistic competition, the increasing market size is 
generally associated with enhanced consumer welfare as the number of  varieties expands and (under 
certain conditions) consumer prices fall. A rather different tradition stems from the ‘location’ 
models attributable to Hotelling (1929) where  products differ only in terms of  location and hence 
the cost of  transportation to different consumer locations. In these models, increased competition 
and entry may have the contrary effect of  eliminating consumer surplus through price 
discrimination (for a review of  the issues see Dorward 1982). This approach seems to be less 
relevant in the current context. Models based upon vertical differentiation, where richer consumers 
favour higher quality products, have also featured in the literature. Again rather different results 
from the monopolistic competition may prevail. As shown by Gabszewicz et al (1981) for example, 
increasing price competition as engendered by international trade may reduce variety, as lower 
quality varieties are eliminated. Despite the diversity of  outcomes suggested by alternative models, 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this possibility.  
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the monopolistic competition model seems to be the appropriate choice for many sectors of  
advanced economy manufacturing where fixed costs are non-negligible, and are often (as in the case 
of  R&D expenditures) specifically directed at product differentiation. At the same time there is 
considerable competition. From the empirical side, the weight of evidence suggests the importance 
of aggregate market size in generating intra-industry trade (for a discussion of the evidence, see 
Grimwade 2000). Moreover the study by Greenaway et al (1995), which specifically attempts to 
distinguish between intra-industry trade based upon vertical and horizontal differentiation, suggests 
that it is the “large numbers” model (i.e.  competitive market structures) which “seems most 
appropriate in explaining intra-industry trade” (p. 1512). We therefore feel justified – for both 
theoretical and empirical reasons - in concentrating on the monopolistic competition model where 
goods are differentiated horizontally. While the Greenaway et al study notes the empirical 
importance of vertical product differentiation for UK intra-industry trade, it needs to be noted that 
their empirical analysis is based on all trade, including trade with developing countries, which is 
likely to be vertically differentiated (see for example Temple (1998). The empirical analysis in the 
current paper is however based on bilateral trade flows between developed economies, almost 
certainly reducing the significance of vertical product differentiation, and the relevance of more 
traditional comparative advantage models of trade such as that advocated by Falvey (1981) based on 
perfectly competitive market structures.  Moreover, research based on the ‘Helpman equation’ 
appears to confirm fully the relevance of the monopolistic competition model for trade between 
developed economies - as in our analysis here (Debaere 2005).  In the light of these considerations, 
as well as its predominance in the literature on intra-industry trade, which partly reflects its analytical 
tractability, we consider the monopolistic completion as the appropriate vehicle for our theoretical 
model which follows.  
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3. A Model of Measurement and Intra-Industry Trade 
 
In this section we present a general equilibrium model where one sector competitively 
produces a homogeneous good and the other is monopolistically competitive, allowing us to 
consider competitive advantage, in the form of  product differentiation. Our model is similar to that 
of  Lawrence and Spiller (1983) which extended the foundations laid by Krugman (1979) and 
Helpman (1981) but introduces the idea of  a ‘measurement-infrastructure’ as discussed above, and 
which creates a public good effect, reducing the costs each firm incurs in product differentiation. 
Howeover, making use of  the measurement infrastructure (in for example implementing a 
standardized test procedure to measuring a particular product characteristic) incurs costs in the 
form of  associated investments (for example in instruments), in what we call ‘measurement capital’. 
Using this framework we establish three propositions.  First, in a closed economy, there is a positive 
relationship between the strength of  the public good effect on the number of  varieties.  Second, 
increased variety is associated with falling prices. Third, the opening up trade between two countries 
benefits both in that the overall volume of  trade between them is bigger than in the absence of  a 
measurement infrastructure. Hence intra-industry trade increases with measurement infrastructure - 
but only up to a certain threshold - beyond which it is not optimal for firms to deploy more 
measurement capital. To establish these propositions, we first consider the closed economy case.  
3. 1 A Closed Economy  
       To consider consumption patterns, consider a representative household maximizing utility 
according to the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) ‘love of  variety’ utility function with two types of  good – 
Y and X :   
 
/
1
1
; 1
s
n
s
i
i
U Y X s
θ
θ−
=
 
= < 
 
∑ ; 0 <θ <1 (1) 
      Total utility is a Cobb-Douglas function formed from consuming a homogeneous good Y , 
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and a differentiable good X   produced in n varieties, indexed by i and forming  the sub-utility 
function in the brackets; s and θ  are parameters, with the latter related to the elasticity of  
substitution, σ, between any pair of  iX , by θ  = (σ-1)/σ.    
     Each household obeys a budget constraint, 
 
1
,
n
i i
i
I P X Y
=
= +∑  (2) 
where income, I , is spent on the purchase of  the i  differentiated goods with their respective 
prices, iP ; Y is the numeraire. Maximizing (1) subject to (2) and with respect to iX and Y  yields, by 
standard methods: 
 
1
(1 )
i
i n
i
i
sYXP
s X
θ
θ
−
=
− ∑
 (3) 
The price elasticity of  demand for each of  the differentiated goods is given by ( )1/ 1θ −  for large 
n . Imposing symmetry across households so that they purchase goods in equal quantities, i.e., 
iX X=  allows us to re-write (3) as: 
 .(1 )
sYP
s nX
=
−
 (4) 
This indicates that an increasing number of  varieties reduces the willingness to pay for any given 
variety.  
Firms produce goods from private inputs. For the homogenou good Y this is done via a Cobb-
Douglas production function given by: 
 1      0< 1Y YY K L
ε ε ε−= <  (5) 
where YL  and YK  are inputs of  labour and capital. Note that the homogenous good does not need 
any measurement capital. The firms take w and r - the unit cost of  labour and capital respectively - 
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as given, so that the profit maximization for a firm producing Y  leads to the usual MR=MC 
conditions: 
 (1 )
Y
Y
Y rK
Y wL
ε
ε
=
− =
 (6) 
In the differentiated goods sector each variety i (i = 1,…, n)  is produced by a single firm which has 
some monopoly power over its particular variety, but each firm is a price taker in input markets.  
These firms also make use of  the measurement infrastructure, indexed by 0 1G≤ < - which 
captures the extent to which the infrastructure can be accessed by firms in production or marketing. 
For a firm using negligible measurement infrastructure, 0G = . The use of  the measurement 
infrastructure however incurs capital costs (which  involve additional expenditures required to 
conform to a given standard, e.g. through the purchase of  instruments). There are therefore both 
benefits and costs in using the measurement infrastructure. The public good effect of  the 
infrastructure is therefore to reduce conventional costs (e.g. in marketing). Using it however requires 
specific investments for measuring and testing equipment, technical documentation etc. described 
by a ‘translator’ function ( )Z G , which indicates required quantities of  measurement capital for a 
chosen level of  G . We make three plausible assumptions about this function.  First, firms in this 
sector must make use of  a minimum amount of  measurement capital (even when 0G = ) implying 
(0) 0Z > .  Second, greater use of  the measurement infrastructure requires greater investment in 
measurement, i.e. '( )Z G >0. We finally assume that the rental price of  measurement capital equals 
that of  conventional capital. We can therefore write the cost function for the production of iX  as: 
 
(1 ) [ ] +rZ(G), >1; 0 1; '( ) 0i iTC G r w X G Z Gα γ β α= − + ≤ < >  (7) 
The term in the square bracket on the right-hand-side gives the total cost of  employing the 
conventional inputs of  capital and labour, made up of  the fixed cost of  employing capital, based on 
a rental price r and capital outlayγ , and the variable cost of  labour founded on a simple production 
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function:    
 
1
,i iX Lβ=  (8) 
where 1/ β  is the marginal product of  labour.   
The term (1 )G α−  in (7) indicates that by use of  the measurement infrastructure G  the firm is able 
to reduce primary input costs, but since the parameter 1α >  there are diminishing returns to its use. 
The condition 1G <  ensures that firms cannot do away entirely with conventional inputs. The 
second term on the right-hand-side in (7) is the cost of  measurement capital evaluated at r .   Note 
that when 0G =  there is no public good effect, and the model collapses to that of  Lawrence and 
Spiller (1983).  
The profit maximizing condition requires that MR=MC. By substituting the marginal costs from the 
total cost function, we obtain the following pricing equation for iX : 
 
(1 )P G
w
α β
θ
−
=  (9) 
The optimal price is independent of  competing varieties but is positively affected by the wage rate. 
Additionally (9) leads to our first proposition1: 
Proposition 1 
Measurement infrastructure enhances household welfare by reducing the mark-up on wages. This results from 
the cost-saving affect of  measurement infrastructure on hiring conventional factors of  production. 
 
It is important now to consider the impact of  measurement infrastructure on product diversity.  
With sufficiently large n , entry will ensure zero profits, so the output produced by the 
                                                 
1 See Mathematical Appendix section 1 
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representative firm using (9) is therefore1:  
 
( )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )i
r r Z GX
w w G α
θγ θ
β θ β θ= +− − −  (10) 
Equation (10) suggests fixed costs dominate variable costs and so firm/plant size increases with the 
factor price ( /r w ) ratio.  Both capital outlays (γ ) and measurement capital ( ( )Z G ) increase firm 
size.  However, a marginal improvement in measurement infrastructure G , increases firm size only 
when the marginal benefit, in the form of  lower variable costs, exceeds the marginal costs associated 
with greater measurement capital.  To proceed we need to consider the overall size of  the economy, 
and suppose that overall factor endowments are fixed at K  and L , so full employment ensures 
that: 
 
Y x
Y
L L nL
K K nγ
= +
= +
 (11) 
where ,  ,  ,  Y Y XL K L nγ denote the amounts firm of  labour and capital used in the production of  Y 
and the differentiated good respectively. 
Using (6), (9), (10), and (11) we can now obtain the extent of product diversity in the 
economy as2:  
(1 )
[ (1 )(1 ) (1 )] ( ) (1 )
Ks
n
s G s Z G sα
θ
γ ε θ ε
−
=
− − + − + −
         (12) 
 
This shows that product variety is positively related to capital endowments but negatively to 
conventional capital outlays (the term on the left hand side of  the denominator) as well as 
measurement capital. Moreover specifying the functional form Z(G) = Q + FG it is possible to 
                                                 
 
1 See Mathematical Appendix section 2 
2 See Mathematical Appendix section 3 
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show that dn/dG > 0  and 
2
2 0
d n
dG
< .1  
Using (12) and differentiating with respect to G , the first-order condition for obtaining the 
maximum value for n is, 
 -1(1-G) =Fααγ  (13) 
This condition says that the firm should increase its use of  measurement infrastructure and invest in 
measurement capital until the marginal costs of  doing so outweigh the marginal benefits.  The left-
hand-side in (13) is the marginal benefit from increasing the measurement infrastructure in the form 
of  the reduction in the cost of  investment on capital outlays and is governed by the parameterα .  
The concavity between the pair ( , )n G  arises because 1α > .  The right-hand-side is the marginal 
cost of  installing measurement capital for a given level of  measurement infrastructure.  By inverting 
(13) we obtain the underlying measurement infrastructure 
1
1* 1 ( / )G F ααγ −= −  that maximizes 
product diversity.  Note that for (13) to hold, the optimum level of  measurement infrastructure and 
capital outlays have to move in the same direction. We therefore can state our second proposition. 
Proposition 2 
In equilibrium, the marginal benefit of  an extra unit of  measurement infrastructure, in the form of  a cost 
reduction in capital outlays, is equal to its marginal cost. 
Intuitively, although the relationship between the product diversity and measurement infrastructure 
is concave, it seems likely that actual observations of  the pair ( , )n G would display a positive 
correlation, as indeed we find in the empirical section.  Not least, this is because of  the public good 
nature of  the measurement infrastructure which suggests its under-provision. However it is a 
possibility that some countries provide sufficient G to be on the downward sloping part of  the 
                                                 
 
1 See Mathematical Appendix section 4 
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curve, so ultimately this is an empirical matter. The extent of  provision in Sweden - is a case in 
point (see figure 2).  
 
3. 2 The Open Economy 
We now consider trade between two economies – Home and Foreign -  which are identical in terms 
of  technologies and household behaviour. The utility function of  a typical consumer in a given 
country is: 
 
* /
1
1 1
              
          
s
n n
s
hi fi
i i
U Y X X
θ
θ θ−
= =
 
= + 
 
∑ ∑  (14) 
where the asterisk (*) refers to the foreign country; bars refer to the consumption of  each good;  the 
subscripts h  and f denote home and foreign production respectively.  Assuming that varieties 
produced in home and foreign countries are n and n*, then goods market equilibrium in a given 
country implies that the value of  consumption of  Home and Foreign products equals the value of  
production, balancing trade: 
 *h fh f hP n X P n X Y P nX Y
− −
+ + = +  (15) 
Using the first-order conditions from utility maximization, imposing symmetry in outputs and 
prices, and profit maximization across monopolistically competitive firms gives the inverse demand 
equation: 
 
(1 )( *)
sP Y
s n n X
−
=
− +
 (16) 
This is similar to the closed economy case (9). Profit maximization problem in the competitive 
sector yields the price for capital and labour analogously to (6) for both countries.  Finally, the zero 
profit condition implies that the output supplied in each country in the differentiated goods sector is 
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similar to that of  (10) assuming that both countries enjoy similar levels of  measurement 
infrastructure (see below). 
3.3 International Trade 
Turning to international trade, we follow Lawrence and Spiller (1983) in allowing countries to differ 
in terms of  both overall size and capital-labour ratio. These relations can be specified by:  
 * *     (2 )    0 1  and >0K a K L a L aλ λ λ= = − ≤ ≤  (17) 
where the term a  is a measure of  the capital-labour differential and λ is a measure of  the size of  
the foreign country relative to the home country.  World capital and labour stock can now be 
defined as: 
 
*
*
(1 )
(1 (2 ) )
W
W
K K K a K
L L L a L
λ
λ
= + = +
= + = + −
 (18) 
The international capital-labour ratio is independent of  measurement infrastructure and is given by
   
                                        [ ]
[1 ]
,    ,
1 (2 )
ak k
a
λδ δ λ
+
= =
+ −
                (19) 
Where k  denotes the capital-labour ratio of  the home country.  The labour and capital endowment 
constraints for firms in each country and for each industry are 
 
* * * *
* * *
,
,
,
,
.
Y
Y
Y
Y
f h
L L nX
L L n X
K K n
K K n
G G G
β
β
γ
γ
= +
= +
= +
= +
= =
 (20) 
The interpretation of  the constraints is similar to before. However, the last condition assumes that 
both countries have similar levels of  measurement infrastructure. This simple formulation is 
intended to display important features of  European markets where – in principle - firms in different 
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countries have access to similar measurement infrastructures1.  
3.4 Trade Volumes 
To find the relationship between infrastructure and trade, we first consider the volume of  trade in 
differentiated goods.  To obtain outputs, we substitute the international wage, rental-cost-of-capital 
and capital-labour ratios in (10)2: 
 
( ) 1
* ,(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
[ (1 )(1 )(1 ) ][ (1 ) ( )]
(1 ) { [ (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ] ( ) (1 )}
Z GX X
G k
s s G G Z G
G s s G Z G s
α
α α
α α
θγ θ
β θ β θ ϕ
θ ε γϕ
γ θ ε ε
 
= = + 
− − − 
+ − − − − +
=
− − + − − + −
 (21) 
As under autarchy, the size of  firms producing the differentiated good increases with the level of  
measurement infrastructure only when the marginal benefit outweighs the direct marginal cost of  
investment in measurement capital.  
Using the total number of  differentiated goods in the world along with home country’s 
share of  world income given by, /( *) (1 ) /( *)z K K K z L L Lpi
− − − − − −
= + + − + , where 0 1z< <  is the 
capital share of  income, the post-trade level of  consumption in industry X  is given by3 
 
[ (1 ) ][ (1 ) ( )]
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
L z z G Z GX
G K a
α
α
θ δ γ
ϕδβ θ λ
−
−
−
+ − − +
=
− − +
 (22) 
The trade surplus obtained by subtracting equation (22) from (21) simplifies to:  
                                                 
1
 Many features of our model share are similar to those of Lawrence and Spiller (1983).  For example the total number 
of varieties produced in the world is the same in either open or autarchic equilibria - holding constant the level 
infrastructure G.   Therefore, there are no firm exit effects when markets integrate.  However, the distribution of the 
production of varieties depends upon capital intensities between countries hence the initial pattern of comparative 
advantage. 
 
2 See Mathematical Appendix in section 5. 
 
3 See Mathematical Appendix section 6. 
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α α
α
θ γ γ λ λ δ γ
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=
− − +
 
  (23) 
The next step is to find out what happens to this trade surplus at different levels of  measurement 
infrastructure.  To simplify matters, let both economies have the same size so that 1a λ δ= = =  and 
assume there are no endowment advantages. Furthermore, assume the functional form 
( ) , (0)Z G Q FG Z Q= + = , for which the level of  measurement infrastructure that maximizes n  is 
given by 
1
1
* 1 FG
α
αγ
− 
= −  
 
.  Now let us numerically compare the trade surplus at two values of  G: 
the optimal *G and 0G =  (i.e., the minimum required infrastructure): 
 *
1 [ (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ] ( ) (1 )
:
2(1 ) [ (1 )(1 )(1 ) ]
s s G Z G sG X
k s s G
α
α
θ γ θ ε ε
θ β θ ε
− + − − + −∆ =
− + − − −
 (24) 
and 
 
1 [ (1 ) (1 )] (1 )0 :
2(1 ) [ (1 )(1 )]
s s Q sG X
k s s
θ γ θ ε ε
θ β θ ε
− + − + −
= ∆ =
− + − −
 (25) 
The expressions (24) and (25) are only numerically comparable.  Therefore, we set values1 for the 
parameters 0.50, 0.4, , , , 0.5, 3, 2s F G Qγ ε θ α= = = = = which satisfy the conditions for the 
optimization.  We find that at the level of  infrastructure G*  the volume of  trade is 72% bigger 
between the two countries.  Furthermore, holding all constant, a rise in the relative country size also 
positively affects the trade surplus, ( ) 0X λ
∂ ∆ >∂ .  This leads to our final proposition. 
 
 
                                                 
1  With the exception of ‘F’ and ‘G’ the remaining data is taken from Lawrence and Spiller (1983).   
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Proposition 3 
Compared with the situation where measurement infrastructure is minimal, raising the level of  infrastructure 
towards the level at which varieties are maximised, also raises intra-industry trade between two equally 
endowed countries.   
Intuitively, this result reflects the impact of  measurement infrastructure in increasing product 
diversity and hence intra-industry trade.  We now turn to the empirical analysis of  the role of  
infrastructure.  
 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
 
The theoretical model outlined in the last section suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between the sophistication of measurement infrastructure, the extent of product variety and hence 
the level of intra-industry trade (over and above that which is dependent upon the impact of market 
size). The model assumed the existence of a measurement infrastructure providing a public good but 
which requires complementary private investments. We argued in section 2 that the extent of this 
infrastructure may be gauged by the existence of industrial standards related to measurement, as well 
as through the demand for instruments.  Accordingly, the aim of this section is to test whether these 
empirical counterparts of measurement infrastructure are indeed correlated with the extent of intra-
industry trade, across both countries and industries. In addition, the determinants of intra-industry 
trade in an EU context are of interest in their own right, not least in that a key feature of the Single 
Market Programme, initiated in 1992, has been the harmonisation of standards across the EU (DTI 
2005).  
A large number of econometric studies have analysed the determinants of intra-industry 
trade. In the current context of a study of bilateral trade across a range of industries, the 
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determinants can be split into country characteristics which are shared between each pair of trading 
partners and industry characteristics which favour either intra-industry trade or inter-industry trade 
through more traditional comparative advantage (e.g. Balassa and Bauwens 1987). Following this 
approach, a basic regression model can be written down as: 
 IIT = F (Z, X1, X2, ε ) 
Where IIT is a measure of intra-industry trade and Z  is a vector of industry characteristics, X1  is a 
vector of shared characteristics across a sub-sample (e.g. a common border) ,  X2   a vector of shared 
characteristics across the whole sample (e.g. the size of the combined market), and ε  an error term. 
The most familiar measure of the extent of intra-industry trade is provided by the Grubel-
Lloyd index (Grubel and Lloyd 1975), which for any particular country pair ,i j  intra-industry trade 
for any given industry k  is given by : 
1 ( ) /( );0 1k ijk ijk ijk ijk kGL abs X M X M GL= − − + < <  
where kGL   is the Grubel Lloyd index of industry k at a given level of statistical aggregation.  The 
term ijkX  is the value of the exports of product group k from country i to country j . Similarly, 
ijkM  is the value of the imports of product group k  into country i from country j .  Evidently, the 
measure varies between 0 and 11. In estimation, the truncation of the Grubel-Lloyd index at 0, 1 
suggests the logit transformation and the measure of intra-industry trade employed here - ( )IIT : 
 ln( ) ln(1 );k kIIT GL GL IIT= − − −∞ < < ∞  
This yields unbiased estimates. 
Now consider the role of shared country characteristics. Monopolistic competition models 
of trade predict market size effects so that the higher the average market size of the two countries 
trading, the greater will be the extent of intra-industry trade (see section 3 above and also for 
example Dixit and Norman 1980). Large differences in market size on the other hand, are likely to 
                                                 
1 A value close to 1 indicates that the difference between exports and imports is small in relation to total trade while a 
value close to zero indicates that most trade in the group is predominantly one-way. 
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depress the extent of intra-industry trade, since the smaller economy generates fewer varieties.  
These effects have typically been captured by overall indicators of aggregate market size, usually the 
logarithm of the average GDP for the two economies and the differences in the logs of their 
respective GDPs (denoted here by lagdp and ldiffgdp)1.  
  Other variables used in studies of intra-industry trade include controls for possible wealth 
effects, language, common borders and distance. The demand for variety is widely believed to expand with 
consumer income, and hence the measure of intra-industry trade should be positively correlated 
with average per-capita incomes. Additionally, differences in per capita incomes may be associated with 
differences in consumer tastes, e.g. Linder (1961)2. Following the literature, we use per capita GDP 
to measure these effects (the logarithms of both the average and the difference, la_p_gdpp, 
ldiff_p_gdpp ). Possible further influences on intra-industry trade include geographical distance 
(e.g. Balassa and Bauwens 1987) (ldist)3. The existence of a common-border or common language 
may also exert an similar influence (dummy variables cb, lang )4.  
The data used are for bilateral trade between 13 EU countries and for 22 industries for 1998 
providing a maximum of 1716 observations. Countries and industries are listed in the Data 
Appendix, where data summaries and data sources can also be found.   
Results of OLS regressions incorporating these shared country characteristics are shown in 
Table 2. Result sets 1 and 2 show regressions with and without industry dummies. All standard 
errors reported use the Huber/White sandwich variance estimator which allows for potential 
                                                 
1 Further details on all variables including data sources can be found in the Data Appendix.  
 
2 Alternatively, it has been suggested that differences in per capita incomes reflect supply-side differences in factor 
endowments – e.g. the capital-labour ratio. The bigger these supply side differences, the greater the role of inter-industry 
trade in bilateral trade. 
 
3 While geographical distance is generally believed to be a proxy for transport costs and hence held to be generally trade 
reducing, it may also be proxying for cultural differences or processing possibilities in industries where bulk or weight is 
important. 
 
4 Empirical studies have also considered the role of tariff and other trade barriers, although these should be considerably 
less important in the context of intra-EU trade and we do not use them. In fact the last observation may well be more 
general, since differences between economies and societies are almost certainly less distinct in the EU context (especially 
in the pre-enlargement EU being considered here) than in most empirical studies of intra-industry trade, so that these 
other controls may also be less important. 
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heteroscedasticity. The results are very similar to others reported in the literature. The coefficients 
on both average GDP and average per capita GDP are positive and highly significant. However 
while the difference in average GDP is negative and significant – in line with the prediction of the 
monopolistic competition model, we do not find that the difference in per capita GDP (although 
negative) has any statistically significant impact. This may reflect the fact that these differences are 
much smaller in a study of the EU (at least prior to enlargement), than in other studies in which per 
capita income differences are much larger across the sample. The distance and common border 
variables are signed in line with expectation and significant, but the latter is only significant at the 
10% level. The language dummy is however insignificant in all our results.  Column 2 shows the 
same regression but with a full set of industry dummies. While these are jointly highly significant, 
there is very little change to the coefficients on shared country characteristics, indicating that the 
cross-sectional variation by industry is operating more or less orthogonally to the shared country 
characteristics.   
 Using GDP to capture market size effects does not allow for the fact that size also has an 
industrial dimension (typically market size is bigger in Germany than in Italy but Italy may have a 
bigger market in pasta). Thus a preferred measure of market size is the value of industrial production 
measured at an industrial level for each of the 22 industries which form our dataset. Accordingly 
result set (3) provides results with measures of market size which are the logarithms of the average 
of the value of production of each of the trading partners (lapi) and the difference in the logarithms 
of their respective levels of production in each industry (ldiffpi). Note however that this reduces 
somewhat the number of observations available, because these data are not available for all 
countries. Incorporating these new variables shows that although the inclusion of an industry 
specific measure of market size is important and reduces the impact of the GDP measure, the latter 
is not eliminated entirely. Omitted factors, other than simple market size, are apparently correlated 
with the overall average economic size of the trading partners.  
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 The results thus far have indicated the importance of industrial characteristics through the 
use of industry dummies, which as the Table shows are statistically highly significant. What are these 
industrial characteristics?  
First allowance is typically made for heterogeneity within an industry where it is possible that 
constituent goods are produced with quite different technologies, so that what is actually inter-
industry trade created by differences in endowment ratios is masquerading as intra-industry trade. 
This is particularly important given the rather high level of aggregation of our industries. Here we 
use the logarithm of the number of five digit commodities within each industry (lncomm) to 
represent heterogeneity. Other industry characteristics leading to intra-industry trade are both more 
complex in character than the country characteristics and generally harder to measure. In addition to 
the concept of product differentiability – our main concern here - studies have generally focused on 
the significance of R&D, and (possibly) the impact of market structure, although the sign of the 
these effects is not always unambiguous. We control for other industrial characteristics using the 
logarithm of R&D per person (eurdpers), and a measure of industrial concentration at the EU level 
derived from Davies and Lyons (1996) – which estimates a Herfindhal index of concentration at the 
three digit level and which depends on both national levels of industrial concentration and the 
degree of concentration of production among the EU economies (heu).  
The central hypothesis of this section is that product differentiability is linked to the supply-
side through the measurement infrastructure as in Proposition 2. We measure cross-industry 
differences in the importance of this infrastructure using the standards count described in section 2. 
Arguably, a high standards count for a particular industry may simply reflect the number of different 
product lines that need to be supported by standards, and indeed, there is a relatively high degree of 
correlation between the logarithm of the standards count (lns) and the logarithm of the number of 
5-digit commodities within each industry (lncomm). For this reason we use the number of 
standards normalised by the number of products in each industry as our preferred indicator of the 
‘public good’ effect of measurement standards (lsratio), i.e. the ‘intensity’ with which standards can 
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be applied to the range of goods within the industry. We conducted experiments with both the 
narrow and broad measures of standards (as described in section 2) but given the high degree of co-
linearity between them, there is little to discriminate between them, and the results reported here in 
set (4) use the narrow measure. It can be seen that this variable is positive and significant, indicating 
that measurement related standards do have an effect on intra-industry trade over and above that 
provided by market size. The other industrial characteristics we use are also significant. The EU 
degree of concentration has a strong negative impact on intra-industry trade, while the R&D 
intensity of the industry (again at the EU level) has a positive influence.  
 
{TABLE 2 about here}  
 
In addition to the usual controls for country differences discussed above, there remains the 
possibility that different economies do not have equal access to the measurement infrastructure. 
Although the standards counted may be all marketed in the all the members of EU, and the 
harmonisation of standards has been an important element of policy, their relevance may differ from 
country to country because of differences in (for example) the availability of services related to 
measurement – technical consultancies and so forth. Here, since as we have argued, the public good 
effect operates at several levels, no simple measure is possible. Our proxy measure for measurement 
capital is here that of the total consumption of instruments in each economy (i.e. production less 
exports plus imports). Ideally we would wish to utilise the intensity of instrument use at the industry 
level. Unfortunately, there is no way of doing this with existing data. However we can use the data 
we have for the (logarithm of) average aggregate intensity of instrument use for each economy pair - 
lacinstratio). The fifth set of results shows that including this variable does have a positive 
coefficient which is significant at the 5% significance level, providing some evidence that the 
availability of measurement infrastructure is not the same for all countries.  
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A number of additional robustness checks were performed and are reported in Table 3.  
First, various authors have considered adjustments to the basic Grubel-Lloyd measure for the 
‘overall’ trade balance (for a discussion, see Grimwade 2000), which therefore functions as a ‘macro-
economic’ factor at the country level. A country with a negative (or positive) overall trade balance 
for example will bias the Grubel-Lloyd index downward. This suggests that a simple solution is to 
include a set of country dummies. To accommodate this, the shared country characteristics were 
dropped.  However, as can be seen from result set 1, the influence of the set of industry 
characteristics was little changed. In particular the impact of standard intensity (lsratio) was nearly 
identical. The second check was for endogeneity in the standard intensities across industries – it may 
be that industries with high levels of intra-industry trade generate lots of standards with causation 
running the other way. Here – reported as result set 2 -  a standard Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity 
was applied, using an ‘instrumenting regression’ of the suspect variable against a set of exogenous 
regressors. The test failed to reject the null of no-endogeneity at all conventional significance levels. 
Finally two checks for possible heteroscedasticity were carried out. Against possible outliers, a 
robust regression technique – available and implemented via STATA® - was employed and reported 
as result set 3.  Alternatively, heteroscedasticity may arise because of the logit transformation of the 
Grubel-Lloyd index as suggested by Bergstrand (1983) who recommends the use of weighted least 
squares1.  In both cases the results are substantially unaltered, with both standard intensity and 
instrument use correctly signed and significant.  
 
{TABLE 3 about here} 
Summary and Conclusion 
Recent growth theory has suggested that increasing variety is an important aspect of 
technical change in modern economies. This paper has argued that measurement provides an 
important way of thinking about such technical change, linking the technology infrastructure to 
                                                 
1 On the basis of the logit transformation of the Grubel Llloyd index, Bergstrand suggests weighting all variables 
(including the constant term) by ((IIT/(1-IIT))0.5 to avoid heteroscedasticity.   
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privately profitable investment decisions, many of which serve to increase product variety. 
Measurement is of course an important input into other aspects of technical change, but the main 
discussion here is focused on the way in which the infrastructure enables firms to differentiate their 
output on the basis of measurable product characteristics. Moreover, the theoretical model is limited 
to the consideration of horizontal differentiation, which in no way denies the importance of vertical 
types of product differentiation in modern economies.  
The paper describes how measurement fits into this infrastructure, from R&D in metrology, 
often conducted via National Measurement Institutes, through instrument manufacture and 
technical testing consultancy, to the use of measurement in industry.  An important element in this 
transmission of knowledge is codified information in the form of measurement related standards - 
technical documents providing information regarding test methods, reference materials etc. - which 
enable firms to conduct measurements.  
The existence of these standards owes much to the public provision of research and 
development in metrology and to the activities of instrument manufacturers and technical services 
linked to measurement. The available stock of standards through which measurement can be 
effectively carried out - especially those originating with national standards bodies -  creates a strong 
public good input to the production activities of firms, effectively supporting networks through 
which products can be compared, tested, etc, and reducing the costs associated with product 
differentiation, and which relate to both the fixed costs of entry and the variable costs of 
production. However, the public good nature of the measurement infrastructure requires 
complementary private investment in the use of measurement. If this hypothesis is accurate, we 
would expect product differentiation to be greater when the infrastructure supporting measurement 
is strong. Much of the theoretical work that considers the relationship between product 
differentiation has – as its basis – the monopolistic competition model – and our theoretical model 
extends this approach. 
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 The theoretical model developed formalises the channel through which a measurement 
infrastructure can be incorporated into an explanation of the observed patterns of intra-industry 
trade. The model is perhaps particularly relevant for economies forming the EU because of the 
emphasis on the harmonization of standards resulting in the creation of a measurement 
infrastructure which is at least partially common.  The model predicts that industries will produce 
more varieties of product when the public good element is strong; in the context of two economies 
engaged in trade, it also predicts that the stronger the measurement infrastructure, the greater is 
intra-industry trade between any two economies.  
The empirical model builds upon from the many studies of intra-industry trade that allow for 
both the shared characteristics between  economies and the characteristics of individual industries – 
to influence the extent of bilateral intra-industry trade within the EU.  It uses bilateral trade data 
from the OECD for 22 manufacturing industries and 13 EU economies. Beyond the variables 
generally considered in that literature – most importantly (and as suggested by the monopolistic 
competition model) the positive influence of the aggregate size of two economies and the negative 
influence of the difference in their size – the regression model is augmented by two indicators 
suggested by the previous discussion of the measurement infrastructure.  First, we use a count of 
measurement related standards across the sample of industries to provide an indicator of the public 
good element provided by the measurement infrastructure. This is treated as common to all 13 
economies. This seems reasonable, since harmonisation of standards across the EU has been an 
important element of the Single Market Programme.  However to allow for possible differences in 
the extent to which individual economies may effectively have differential access to this 
infrastructure (e.g. through the activities of NMIs, a strong measurement and testing or instrument 
industry) our analysis also included a measure of an economy’s overall use of instruments. Our 
econometric results confirmed the relevance of both the variables suggested by the simple 
monopolistic model but also these additional indicators.  In particular, we found a strong positive 
link between standards and variations in intra-industry trade, confirming the prediction of the 
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model. The positive and statistically significant impact of an economy’s overall use of instruments 
however, suggests that that not all countries have equal access to the measurement infrastructure.  
The econometric results obtained appear to be robust to various checks, but the statistical 
correlation between standards variety and trade is of course susceptible to other interpretations, 
including the possibility that both increase with technological maturity, so it is important to note that 
the standards measure used here relates to measurement related standards, which we believe are 
important when technologies are developing and prior to the creation of a dominant design 
associated with technological maturity. Moreover, technology cycles almost certainly operate at a 
lower level of aggregation than the empirical analysis conducted here. Clearly however, the question 
of the typical time pattern for the generation of different types of standards is an important question 
for future research.  
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Data Appendix 
 
VARIABLES USED IN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE (Source: OECD Bilateral Trade Database for 1998) 
 
Logit transformation of the Grubel-Lloyd Index (GL) (identifier IIT):  
 
  GL i,j,k = 1 – [abs (X i,j,k - M i,j,k)/ (X i,j,k + Mi,j,k)) 
 
Where i = exporting country 1, ….13, j = importing country 1,……13, k =industry 1, …..22 
 
The index was constructed for the following 13 countries: Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany, 
Denmark, Greece, Spain, United Kingdom, France, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Sweden.   
 
The industries used are from the International Standard Industrial Classification Rev 2 (ISIC rev 2) 
and are all in manufacturing: 
 
Other Manufacturing; Professional Goods; Other Transport Equipment; Aircraft; Motor Vehicles; 
Shipbuilding & Repairing; Radio, TV & Communication Equipment; Electrical Machinery; Office & 
Computing Machinery; Non-Electrical Machinery; Metal Products; Non-Ferrous Metals; Iron & 
Steel; Non-metallic Mineral Products; Rubber & Plastic Products; Petroleum Refineries & Products; 
Drugs & Medicines; Chemicals excluding Drugs; Paper, Paper Products & Printing; Wood Products 
& Furniture; Textiles, Apparel & Leather and Food, Beverages & Tobacco.  
 
Potentially there are 13 x 12 x 22/2 = 1767 observations  
 
 
 
2. COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Average level of GDP in each country pair (la_gdpp) The logarithm of average GDP values between two 
countries (in PPP$ billion) (Source: OECD National Accounts) 
 
The difference in the value of GDP in each country pair (ldiff_gdpp)The difference in the logarithm of the 
absolute value of the difference in GDP for each pair of countries  (Source: OECD National 
Accounts) 
 
The value of production by country pair and industry (la_pi ) 
The logarithm of the arithmetic mean of the value of production by industry for each pair of 
countries in 1998 (Source: OECD STAN ) 
 
The difference in the value of production by country pair and industry (ldiff_pi ) 
The logarithm of the absolute difference in the value of production between each pair of countries 
in 1998. (Source: OECD STAN) 
 
The average level of per capita GDP (la_p_gdpp). The logarithm of average income per capita for 1998 
(measured by GDP/population) between two countries and evaluated PPP$s as estimated by the 
OECD. (Source: OECD National Accounts) 
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The difference in per capita GDP between trading partners (ldiff_p_gdpp) The logarithm of the absolute 
different income per capita between two partner countries in 1998 as evaluated in PPP$ (Source: 
OECD National Accounts) 
 
The distance between two trading partners in kilometres (ldist). The distances between the cities of 
corresponding regions are measured by the “great circle distance” formula based on the latitudes 
and longitude of each city. Therefore, All EU 15 countries are split into 206 regions and all these 
distances are weighted by their related GDP share calculated by GDPm/GDP, where GDPm is the 
GDP value of a region and GDP is at the whole country level. (source: Chen 2004) 
 
Common Border (cb). A dummy variable = 1 if the country pair share a common border. 
 
Common Language (lang) A dummy variable = 1 if the country pair share the same language. 
  
Instrument Consumption Intensity (la_cinstratio) The logarithm of the average intensity of instrument 
consumption between two countries with intensity measured by overall instrument consumption 
deflated by average GDP (Source: Williams (2002) for instrument consumption data by country.  
 
 
 
2. INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Industrial Concentration (identifier heu)  Source: Davies and Lyons (1996)) 
This was constructed from an estimate of the Herfindahl Index at the EU level at the three digit 
NACE classification and aggregated using a geometric mean of the constituent industries.  
 
R&D intensity (eurdpers) Business expenditure on Research and Development (measured in $ PPPs 
for the EU (exc Portugal) in each industry deflated by the aggregate level of employment. Source: 
OECD ANBERD-Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development data for 1998 and 
STAN- STructural ANalysis data for employment) 
 
Industrial Heterogeneity (lncomm) The logarithm of the number of commodity headings at the 5-digit 
level in each industry ource:  Based upon the OECD Databases (ITCS- International Trade by 
commodity Statistics)  
 
The strength of the measurement infrastructure (lsratio) This is the logarithm of a cross industry count of 
publicly available standards published in PERINORM© which incorporate a reference in their 
descriptors to both measurement and testing. Specially constructed descriptors were used to allocate 
standards to each industry. This count has been normalised by the number of commodities in each 
of the 22 industries (see above)   (Source: PERINORM©, King et al (2005))  
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SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
TABLE A1  
Summary data 
 
No of 
observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Variable
iit2 1695 0.38 1.85 -8.93 8.90
la_gdpp 1716 6.20 0.76 4.86 7.40
ldiff_gdpp 1716 5.68 1.73 0.26 7.51
la_pi 1483 22.88 1.20 17.83 25.48
ldiff_pi 1483 22.70 1.61 14.05 25.82
la_p_gdpp 1716 9.99 0.11 9.66 10.17
ldiff_p_gdpp 1716 7.81 1.22 2.83 9.39
ldist 1716 7.09 0.56 5.23 8.05
cb 1716 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
lang 1716 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
la_cinsratio 1716 1.60 0.43 0.37 2.38
heu 1638 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.20
eurdpers 1716 4028.18 4783.92 145.00 17466.00
lncomm 1716 3.99 1.36 1.61 5.97
lsratio 1716 0.97 0.97 -0.76 2.83  
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Mathematical Appendix 
 
Section 1 
 
Profit-maximisation requires MR=MC, 
In the model MR, marginal revenue, is 
1(1 )P
η
− , where elasticity 
1
1
η
θ
=
−
.  
MC, marginal cost, is (1 )w G αβ − . Therefore, we can write the profit maximizing condition as 
1(1 ) (1 )P w G αβ
η
− = − . Then we obtain the following pricing equation for Xi 
(1 )P G
w
α β
θ
−
= . 
 
The mark-up is therefore dependent upon G 
 
 
Section 2 
 
The profits the firm receives, pi , can be expressed as: 
 
PX TCpi = −                                                                                (M 2.1) 
 
The first term is total revenue, and the second term is total cost. 
 
Set 0pi = , Using equations (7) and (9) in the text  we can now obtain 
 
(1 ) (1 ) [ ] +rZ(G)i
G w X G r w X
α
αβ γ β
θ
−
= − +                              (M 2.2) 
 
After rearranging equation (M 2.2), we finally obtain equation (10) in the text. 
 
( )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )i
r r Z GX
w w G α
θγ θ
β θ β θ= +− − −  
 
 
Section 3 
 
According to equation (11) in the text, the labour endowment in home country is: 
 
(1 )
Y YL L nX L n X Y n X
w
εβ β β−= + = + = +                              (M 3.1) 
 
(1 ) (1 )sL nXP n X
w s
ε β− −= +                                                          (M 3.2) 
 
Rearranging, we obtain: 
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(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ( ) ( ){ }(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
r s G s Z G Z GL n
w s s G
α
α
ε γ ε θγ θ
θ θ θ θ
− − − − −
= + + +
− − − − −
 
                                                                                                         (M 3.3) 
 
The capital endowment in home country is: 
 
(1 )
Y
sK K n nXP n
r s
εγ γ−= + = +                                                     (M 3.4) 
 
(1 ) ( ) (1 )( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
s r r Z G G wK n n
r s w w G
α
α
ε θγ θ β γβ θ β θ θ
− −
= + +
− − −
     (M 3.5) 
 
[ (1 )(1 ) (1 )] ( ) (1 )
(1 )
s G s Z G sK n
s
αγ ε θ ε
θ
− − + − + −
=
−
                            (M 3.6) 
 
After rearranging equation (M.3.6), we obtain equation (12) in the text. 
 
(1 )
[ (1 )(1 ) (1 )] ( ) (1 )
Ks
n
s G s Z G sα
θ
γ ε θ ε
−
=
− − + − + −
 
 
 
Section 4 
 
The parameter restrictions are: 1α > ; 0 1ε< < ;0 1s< < ,0 1θ< < and 0 1G≤ <  
 
Assuming ( )Z G Q FG= + , equation (12) in the text becomes 
 
(1 )
[ (1 )(1 ) (1 )] ( ) (1 )
Ks
n
s G s Q FG sα
θ
γ ε θ ε
−
=
− − + − + + −
,                     (M 4.1) 
 
  
(1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
Ks
n
s G s Q FG sα
θ
ε γ θ γ ε
−
=
− − + − + + −
                             (M.4.2) 
 
In order to simplify, let: 
 
(1 )A Ks θ≡ −                                                                                         (M 4.3) 
 
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )B s G s Q FG sαε γ θ γ ε≡ − − + − + + −                                  (M.4.4) 
 
So equation (M.4.2) becomes  
 
A
n
B
=                                                                                                         (M 4.5) 
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Since A  (M.4.3) is not a function of G , it can be viewed as a constant. In order to simplify the 
mathematics, we only need to establish the relationship between  B  (equation A 2.2) and G . Note 
that n  is inversely proportional toB , i.e. when B  has a minimum point, n  has a maximum point 
and vice versa.  
 
The first and second derivatives of B are:  
 
1
' (1 )(1 ) (1 )B s G s Fααγε ε−= − − − + −                                                            (M 4.6) 
 
2
'' ( 1) (1 )(1 ) 0B s G αα αγε −= − − − >                                                                  (M 4.7) 
 
Since ''( ) 0B G >  B  will have a minimum point at the level of G which maximizes n (G* in text).   
 
Section 5 
 
Two steps are needed to obtain the international capital-labour ratio k ; the first is to get the 
international labour endowment. 
 
 According to equations (22) and (24) in the text, the world labour stock is 
 
 * * * *W Y YL L L L nX L n Xβ β= + = + + +                                                     (M 5.1) 
 
Since all firms are of equal size, *X X= , equation (M 5.1) becomes 
 
*( *) ( )W Y YL n n X L Lβ= + + +                                                                     (M 5.2) 
 
(1 )( *) ( *)WL n n X Y Y
w
εβ −= + + +                                                            (M 5.3) 
 
After rearranging of Equations (M 5.1) and (M 5.2), international labour endowment is 
 
[(1 ) ( )] (1 ) {(1 )(1 )[(1 ) ( )]}( *) (1 )(1 )w
r s G Z G G s G Z GL n n
w s G
α α α
α
θ γ ε γ
θ
− + + − − − − +
= +
− −
  (M 5.4) 
 
And international capital endowment: 
 
*
* *WK K K Y n Y n
r r
ε εγ γ= + = + + +                                                           (M 5.5) 
 
And 
 
(1 )( *) ( *)W
sK n n XP n n
r s
εγ −= + + +                                                   (M 5.6) 
 
Rearranging, the amount of international capital is therefore: 
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(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )( *){ }(1 )W
s G s Z GK n n
s
αε γ εγ
θ
− − + −
= + +
−
                               (M 5.7) 
 
Thus, the international capital-labour ratio k  is W
W
Kk
L
=                                                                            
 
 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )( *){ }(1 )
[(1 ) ( )] (1 ) {(1 )(1 )[(1 ) ( )]}( *) (1 )(1 )
s G s Z G
n n
sk
r s G Z G G s G Z G
n n
w s G
α
α α α
α
ε γ εγ
θ
θ γ ε γ
θ
− − + −
+ +
−
=
− + + − − − − +
+
− −
  (M 5.8) 
 
Finally, 
 
[ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )](1 )
[ (1 ) ( )][ (1 )(1 )(1 ) ]
s s G s Z G G wk
G Z G s s G r
α α
α α
γ θ ε γ ε
γ θ ε
− + − − + − −
=
− + + − − −                            (M 5.9) 
 
Therefore, the international wage-rental ratio is 
 
[ (1 )(1 )(1 ) ][ (1 ) ( )]
[ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )](1 ) ]
w s s G G Z G k k
r s s G s Z G G
α α
α α
θ ε γ ϕ
γ θ ε γ ε
− −+ − − − − +
= =
− + − − + − −
                  (M 5.10)  
 
 
where 
[ (1 )(1 )(1 ) ][ (1 ) ( )]
[ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )](1 ) ]
s s G G Z G
s s G s Z G G
α α
α α
θ ε γϕ
γ θ ε γ ε
+ − − − − +
=
− + − − + − −
 
 
Substituting the international wage-rental ratio into equation (20) we obtain equation 
(25) in the text. 
 
 
 
Section 6 
Assuming that the home country’s share of world income is /( *) (1 ) /( *)z K K K z L L Lpi
− − − − − −
= + + − + , 
consumption of the differentiated good in home country is:  
 
(1 ) ( )[ ]*[ ](1 ) (1 ) (1 )( *) ( *)
zK z L r r Z GX X
w w GK K L L
α
θγ θ
pi β θ β θ
− −
−
− − − −
−
= = + +
− − −+ +
          (M 6.1) 
 
On rearranging, total consumption of the differentiated good (equation 26 in the text) 
 
[ (1 ) ][ (1 ) ( )]
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
L z z G Z GX
G K a
α
α
θ δ γ
ϕδβ θ λ
−
−
−
+ − − +
=
− − +
 can be obtained.    (M.6.2) 
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Figures 
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Figure 2 
Production and Consumption of Instruments in the EU
(% of industrial output 1999/2000) 
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Figure 3 
Numbers of Standards in the BSI 
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Measurement Related 
Standards Stocks for 2002
Industry 
Number Narrow Broad
1 Other Manufacturing 144 378
2
 Professional Goods 918 1614
3 Other Transport Equipment 53 166
4 Aircraft 106 561
5 Motor Vehicles 114 305
6 Shipbuilding & Repairing 27 59
7 Radio, TV & Communication Equipment 399 1160
8 Electrical Machinery 843 2194
9 Office & Computing Machinery 27 268
10 Non-Electrical Machinery 855 2408
11 Metal Products 347 1088
12 Non-Ferrous Metals 122 221
13 Iron & Steel 92 166
14 Non-metallic Mineral Products 290 775
15 Rubber & Plastic Products 215 554
16 Petroleum Refineries & Products 217 357
17 Drugs & Medicines 13 38
18 Chemicals excluding Drugs 695 1022
19 Paper, Paper Products & Printing 206 412
20 Wood Products & Furniture 52 171
21 Textiles, Apparel & Leather 266 791
22 Food, Beverages & Tobacco 508 713  
Source: PERINORM© 
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Table 2  
 
RESULT SET (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable IIT IIT IIT IIT IIT
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
coefficient
Robust 
standard 
errors siga coefficient
Robust 
standard 
errors siga coefficient
Robust 
standard 
errors siga coefficient
Robust 
standard 
errors siga coefficient
Robust 
standard 
errors siga
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IDENTIFIER
COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Log of Average GDP la_gdpp 0.434 0.069 *** 0.441 0.068 *** 0.310 0.140 ** 0.341 0.090 *** 0.336 0.090 ***
Difference in Log of GDP ldiff_gdpp -0.110 0.026 *** -0.108 0.025 *** -0.049 0.032 -0.054 0.032 * -0.057 0.032 *
Log of Average GDP per caput la_p_gdpp 3.581 0.543 *** 3.616 0.521 *** 3.226 0.548 *** 3.435 0.563 *** 2.767 0.616 ***
Log of Difference in GDP per caput ldiff_p_gdpp -0.033 0.035 -0.032 0.032 -0.032 0.037 -0.033 0.034 -0.004 0.037
Log of Distance ldist -0.467 0.116 *** -0.470 0.110 *** -0.440 0.129 *** -0.507 0.123 *** -0.577 0.121 ***
Common Border Dummy cb 0.237 0.131 * 0.233 0.129 * 0.241 0.154 0.247 0.135 * 0.261 0.135 *
Common Language Dummy lang 0.111 0.157 0.117 0.150 0.048 0.199 0.037 0.168 -0.056 0.173
Log of average intensity of instrument 
consumption la_cinstratio - - - - 0.281 0.140 **
INDUSTRY-COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Log of Industrial production la_pi - - 0.343 0.126 *** 0.241 0.075 *** 0.234 0.076 ***
Difference in log of industrial production ldiff_pi - - -0.246 0.050 *** -0.222 0.052 *** -0.216 0.052 ***
INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Log of number of commodities in industry lncomm - - - 0.323 0.047 *** 0.324 0.047 ***
EU industry concentration heu - - - -3.532 1.242 *** -3.661 1.240 ***
R&D per person in EU eurdpers - - - 0.027 0.011 ** 0.027 0.011 **
Log of standard intensity lsratio - - - 0.291 0.053 *** 0.290 0.053 ***
Constant -34.097 5.847 *** -34.097 5.847 *** -32.048 6.081 *** -34.000 6.203 *** -27.427 6.595 ***
INDUSTRY DUMMIES NO YES YES NO NO
F-test of industry dummies - F(21,1666)= 9.330 *** F(21,1444)= 7.580 ***
No of observations 1695 1695 1475 1412 1412
F- statistic of equation F(7,1687) = 44.27 *** F(28,1666) = 19.00 *** F(30,1444) = 17.44 *** F(13, 1398) = 33.08 *** F(14,1397) = 31.31 ***
Prob (>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.1588 0.2456 0.2660 0.2363 0.2388
a
 significance *** variable is significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%  
Taking the Measure of Things: the Role of Measurement in EU Trade 
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Table 3 
 
RESULT SET
Dependent variable
Estimation method
Coefficient
Robust 
standard 
errors sig coefficient
Robust 
standard 
errors sig coefficient
Robust 
standard 
errors sig
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IDENTIFIER
COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Log of Average GDP la_gdpp 0.355 0.100 *** 0.285 0.092 *** 0.208 0.073 ***
Difference in Log of GDP ldiff_gdpp -0.058 0.033 * -0.051 0.032 -0.045 0.025 *
Log of Average GDP per caput la_p_gdpp 2.787 0.632 *** 2.145 0.606 *** 0.276 0.098 ***
Log of Difference in GDP per caput ldiff_p_gdpp -0.004 0.040 -0.029 0.038 -0.025 0.03
Log of Distance ldist -0.573 0.136 *** -0.636 0.131 *** -0.679 0.073 ***
Common Border Dummy cb 0.262 0.159 0.170 0.153 0.067 0.116
Common Language Dummy lang -0.052 0.209 -0.008 0.201 -0.085 0.158
Log of average intensity of instrument 
consumption la_cinstratio 0.284 0.131 ** 0.294 0.126 *** 0.35 0.091 ***
COUNTRY DUMMIES YES NO NO
INDUSTRY-COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Log of Industrial production la_pi 0.173 0.075 ** 0.217 0.078 *** 0.278 0.071 *** 0.211 0.372 ***
Difference in log of industrial production ldiff_pi -0.179 0.043 *** -0.215 0.050 *** -0.206 0.048 *** -0.159 0.057 ***
INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Log of number of commodities in industry lncomm 0.333 0.046 *** 0.338 0.050 *** 0.272 0.044 *** 0.206 0.035 ***
EU industry concentration heu -3.727 1.272 *** -3.063 1.580 * -3.204 1.263 ** -2.761 1.04 ***
R&D per person in EU eurdpers 0.027 0.011 * 0.021 0.014 0.025 0.011 ** 0.02 0.01 **
Log of standard intensity lsratio 0.289 0.053 *** 0.300 0.051 *** 0.217 0.041 ***
Predicted value of instrumenting equation 0.322 0.071 ***
Residual of instrumenting equation 0.140 0.226
Constant -1.02 1.167 -27.503 6.925 ***
No of observations 1412 1412 1412 1412
F- statistic of equation F(18,1936) = 25.84 F( 15,  1396) 29.23 *** F(14,1397) 31.89 *** F( 15,  1397) 31.89
Prob (>F) 0 0 0 0
R2 0.2798 0.2390 0.2706
1
 *** significant at 1% ** 5% * 10%
OLS Hausmann-Wu Weighted Least Squares
(3)
IIT
Robust Regression
(1) (2) (4)
IIT IIT IIT
 
 
 
 
